

## Industry Releasable Threat Assessment



Current as of 1<sup>st</sup> December 2020



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## Introduction

1. This Industry Releasable Threat Assessment (IRTA) has been jointly written by both the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) and the European Union Naval Force Somalia (EU NAVFOR).
2. Its purpose is to articulate the threat to merchant and large fishing vessels transiting the Red Sea, Bab al Mandeb Strait (BAM), Gulf of Aden (GOA) and the Western Indian Ocean. It updates the previous IRTA released on 01 Sep 20, which had an Information Cut Off Date (ICOD) of 21 Aug 20.
3. Two IRTBs were issued during the reporting period (MV AEGEAN II and explosion on MT SYRA).
4. The ICOD for this threat assessment is 15 Nov 20.

## Executive Summary

5. The threat to merchant and large fishing vessels transiting the Red Sea, BAM, GOA and the Western Indian Ocean :
  - a. From piracy is **LOW** (an attack is unlikely).
  - b. From conflict-related activity is **MODERATE** for KSA- and SLC-flagged vessels (an attack is possible but unlikely) and **LOW** for the others. The threat against vessels of any flag operating from or to ports operated by actors in the Yemen Conflict is considered MODERATE.
  - c. From terrorism is **LOW** (an attack is unlikely).

## Situation in Somalia

6. The upcoming presidential elections dominate the political Agenda in Somalia. The expected dates for the different elections are as follows: 01 - 10 December election for Upper House. 11-27 December election for Lower House, and on 08 February 2021, members of parliament (MP) will elect the new President of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS).
7. Mohamed Hussein Roble was appointed as Prime Minister (PM) of Somalia on 23 Sep 20. On 19 Oct 20, the new PM announced the composition of the new cabinet.
8. The Political Dialogue between the EU and the Somali authorities took place on 11 Nov 20 in Mogadishu with the presence of the military commanders of EU NAVFOR and EUTM Somalia and Head of EUCAP Somalia. It was agreed to reinforce the importance of maritime security, together with other EU instruments working in the same field such as EU NAVFORs sister mission EUCAP Somalia.
9. According to figures of the UN Migration Agency for 2020, the migrants of different nationalities travelling from Somali coast to Yemen are slightly increasing since September, although the Somali migration is significant descending in the same period.

10. Notwithstanding the ongoing pressure from AMISOM and the Somalia National Army (SNA), which has managed to neutralize a significant number of the terrorist's group commanders, Al-Shabaab (AS) has been able to maintain its freedom of manoeuvre and capabilities mostly in the South-Central regions and dropping them in Mogadishu. AS continues in its tactics, with top authorities and military figures becoming AS' main targets.

11. AS remains active in PUNTLAND and maintains linkages to actors able to facilitate access to the sea for trafficking purposes (weapons, foreign combatants, immigration, maritime smugglings). IS-S remains active in the Bari region in the northeastern area of Puntland.

12. Somalia continues to face a dire humanitarian situation, with an estimated 5.2 million people in need of humanitarian assistance. This is attributed to cumulative shocks, including an erratic 2020 rainy season, widespread and severe seasonal flooding, desert locust infestation, socio-economic impacts of COVID-19 and protracted conflict -and flood-related displacement. The overlapping of these factors affects Somalia's efforts to stabilize its social and economic conditions.

### **Situation in Yemen**

13. During this reporting period, the Houthi military campaign continued in the North amid renewed clashes around Hodeida port. Throughout Sep and most of Oct Houthi forces managed to make new gains in the oil-rich Marib governorate and consolidated control over territory in the neighbouring al-Bayda governorate.

14. Drone and missile attacks by the Houthis against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), and coalition airstrikes targeting Houthi positions continued throughout Sep and Oct. There was a significant increase in Houthi drone and missile attacks near the end of Oct. The Saudi-led coalition forces claimed interception of six Houthi drones and three Houthi ballistic missiles targeting southwestern KSA on 28 Oct 20. The Saudi-led coalition claimed interception of Houthi drones daily between 23-28 Oct.<sup>1</sup>

15. On the diplomatic front, UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths, presented in mid-September the latest draft of his "Joint Declaration" initiative to the Houthis and Hadi led Government of Yemen, which calls for a nationwide ceasefire, economic and humanitarian confidence-building measures and national political talks. Both parties implemented a prisoner exchange deal, which officially took place on 15 Oct. Some 680 Houthi rebels and 400 pro-government fighters were transferred between the capital Sanaa and the second city of Aden as part of the deal. Similarly, on 14 Oct the exchange of two US hostages in return for 200 detained Houthis was made between Oman and Yemen.

16. In mid-Sep, the (internationally recognized) Government of Yemen (GoY) and separatists from the Southern Transition Council (STC) resumed power-sharing talks after the STC withdrew from talks in late Aug citing government attacks on its forces. Even though discussions are still underway, there is still a long way until an agreement is likely reached as both parties have rigid requirements.

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<sup>1</sup> <https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/gulf-of-aden-security-review/gulf-of-aden-security-review-october-30-2020>

17. The deteriorating humanitarian situation in Yemen will persist as the COVID-19 pandemic continues to affect the most vulnerable. Large population movement will likely exacerbate the humanitarian situation and continue to degrade the state economy.

### **Situation in Mozambique**

18. Since late 2017, the east African nation of Mozambique has experienced a fast growing and violent insurgency in its northernmost province Cabo Delgado. With Tanzania to its north and the Mozambique Channel to its east, Cabo Delgado and its main maritime port of Mocímboa da Praia is a key hub for the country's maritime shipping industry and an approximately more than \$50 billion USD liquid natural gas (LNG) project developed by energy companies.

19. Attempting to establish an Islamic state in the region the native extremist group known as 'Ansar al-Sunna' or Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP), aligned with Islamic State. On Tuesday 11 Aug 20, ISCAP seized control of the port of Mocímboa da Praia, destroying a government naval patrol boat in the process. Since then, ISCAP has under its control Vamizi, Metundo and Sita islands, and the road between Palma and Mueda, which is the only link to the rest of the country while the port of Mocimboa da Praia is the only place Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) can be emptied. Previous to this, ISCAP has reportedly launched numerous attacks on coastal villages using coordinated landward and amphibious assaults.

20. With a significant percentage of funding for the group raised from illegal sources, ISCAP relies on access to the maritime domain for smuggling and human trafficking - which the group also uses to send recruits to Tanzania, Kenya and Somalia for military and ideological training. It is assessed that ISCAP may focus its attention to the maritime domain used by smugglers and traffickers in the region to increase revenue, resources and possibly intelligence on the movement of vessels out to sea.

21. In September 2020, Mozambican authorities have requested the EU assistance in the form of counterterrorism training, logistics and medical equipment. In response to Mozambique's official request, the EU delivered a letter to the Mozambican government pledging to provide humanitarian and security support. The security assistance will be the first official international intervention specifically directed at improving the government's ability to fight in Cabo Delgado. The eventual support package will be aid in terms of training, logistics and medical services for the forces fighting terrorism in northern Mozambique.

22. On 14 Oct 20, insurgents entered Kitaya, a village in Tanzania's Mtwara region on the north bank of the Rovuma river. On 28 Oct 20, insurgents returned to Tanzania claiming to have attacked three villages in Mtwara region (Michenjele, Mihambwe, and Nanyamba). These attacks are not the first insurgent incursion into Tanzania since the start of the Cabo Delgado insurgency, but they are certainly the most significant, having attempted expanding into Tanzania but thus far failed. Early November, at least 50 people drowned off the coast of Mozambique when their boat capsized as they fled from violence in Cabo Delgado. The tragedy began to surface after some 20 survivors managed to swim to Pemba Beach.

23. Between 06-08 November 50 people were beheaded in Muatide, Muidumbe district, which has been one of the greatest atrocities since the beginning of the conflict. The wider

Intl. Community and the UN Secretary-General António Guterres have condemned this atrocity.

24. The Mozambican government estimates that there are about 500,000 people displaced by violence conflict in Cabo Delgado, plus many others who have fled to other provinces.

### **Significant events 21 Aug 20 to 15 Nov 20**

#### **Piracy**

25. There have been no incidents of piracy during the reporting period, although it is not unusual for MVs to initially report suspicious approaches by skiffs as possible pirate attacks. The last confirmed pirate attacks were conducted in the Somali Basin against the Republic of Korea (ROK) flagged FV ADRIA and the Spanish flagged FV TXORI ARG1 on 19 Apr 19, which were both unsuccessful.


#### **Conflict Related**

26. **03 Oct 20** MT SYRA (IMO: 9436941), while loading oil at a SPM (Single Point Mooring) in a Government of Yemen (GoY) operated facility, sustained a single, non-accidental, external explosion. Prior to the explosion members of the tanker's crew reported spotting up to three (as initially reported) floating objects with attached light or fluorescent material upon them in the water. Over a period of approximately 65 minutes one came into contact with the tanker's port side and is highly likely associated with the explosion. Another object reportedly passed at around 20 meters of the ship and exploded. Subsequent investigation indicates that there was no third floating object. The vessel subsequently proceeded to sea with ship, master and crew all reported safe. There are no consistent facts to assert what type of object allegedly caused the explosions.

#### **Terrorism**

27. **27 Aug 20**. A suspected ISCAP amphibious attack took place on Nhonge Island (Cabo Delgado Province, Mozambique). Unconfirmed reporting has suggested that murders, including beheadings, and kidnapping may have been perpetrated as well as the seizure of vessels. Further reports suggest that the group attempted to steal goods and killed four individuals.

28. **05, 09 SEP 20**. According to open sources, the ISCAP (Islamic State's Central Africa Province) seized Metundo and Vamizi Island (Cabo Delgado Province) within Mozambique territorial waters.



**Figure 1 - Location of Terrorist Attacks in Mozambique**


### **Maritime Security Events – Other Maritime Crime**

29. **20 Aug 20.** MV AEGEAN II (IMO: 9016911), previously reported in IRTB 020 dated 28 Aug 20 and subsequently para 22 of IRTA dated 01 Sep 20. Most recent report from the shipping company states that the personal belongings and the weapons of the PAST were not returned to the crew.

### **Maritime Security Events – Suspicious Activity**

30. **21 Oct 20.** MV APL CALIFORNIA (IMO: 9350044) reported being approached by 2 skiffs at high speed. One of the skiffs had 4 armed people on board wearing khaki uniforms. MV increased speed and skiffs crossed the MV's wake from port to starboard, CPA 500m. Other than the armed crew members, no other tripwires were observed.





**Figure 2** - Location of Conflict related event and MSE

### Non-Maritime Security Events

31. **03 Sep 20.** MV NABILA 5 (IMO: 8705618) reported being approached by a skiff which circled the vessel at 300m. No tripwires observed.
32. **09 Sep 20.** MV BOW ORION (IMO: 9818515) reported that a high-speed skiff (10 people on board with weapons), claiming to be YEMEN CG, approached to MV SHANDONG HAI CHANG (IMO: 9502647) from its port quarter. The skiff asked for information (cargo, security, owner's info) and ordered MV SHANGDONG HAI CHANG to stop their engines, but the MV continued their journey. After a few minutes, the skiff moved away and approached to MV BOW ORION. The MV implemented counter-piracy measures and mustered the PAST on the bridge, distance 0.4NM from skiff. The skiff stopped following and moved away to contact other vessels in the vicinity. According to another source, the skiff was YEMEN CG conducting their own patrol mission 16NM from the YEMEN coast.
33. **17 Sep 20.** MV ALLIANCE ST LOUIS (IMO: 9285500) reported the approach of 2 skiffs at a range of 0.8NM. A third was spotted at 3NM. No tripwires were observed.
34. **04 Oct 20.** MT ANDROMEDA (IMO: 9352561) reported being approached by 2 dark painted fast skiffs with 4-5 people on board (reportedly in military uniform) whilst the MV was heading towards the IRTC. Small arms were sighted but no piracy paraphernalia. PAST delivered warning shots at 300m distance from MV and again at 200m. The skiffs

subsequently turned away; it is assessed that a Yemeni authority LIKELY controlled the Skiffs, however the Yemeni Liaison Officer to CMF was unable to confirm they were controlled by the Yemeni Coastguard.

35. **07 Oct 20.** MV INCE PACIFIC (IMO: 9229001) observed 2 skiffs approaching with 1 closing to a CPA 0.8NM. Skiffs diverted course.

36. **29 Oct 20.** TUG CYATHEA (IMO: 9901520) reported being approached by a skiff at 0.8NM. After PAST showed weapons, the skiff altered direction and took up a parallel course, following the Merchant vessel at 1NM. After approximately 50 minutes, the skiff stopped shadowing the CYTHEA and was last seen heading south towards the Somali coast. Vessel and crew reported safe.

37. **07 Nov 20.** MV DUBAI SUN (IMO: 9426740) reported being approached by a skiff with 3 POB, speed at 25.9kts. The skiff was initially 2.5NM ahead of the starboard bow, crossed bow, circled back to starboard and crossed bow again at CPA 100m. The image of skiff showed the lack of piracy related equipment on board.

38. A number of approaches by skiffs were reported by MV in the GOA, however the ranges between MV and skiffs prevent an accurate assessment of tripwires or risk.




Figure 3 - Location of Non-Maritime Security Event



## **Assessment**

### **Piracy – LOW (an attack is unlikely)**

39. The SW monsoon is effectively over, although its duration was longer (until early of October) than expected (mid September). Nevertheless, predominating weather conditions in the AOO remain unsettled with periods of moderate to severe conditions yet persisting in the GoA, HoA and SB, causing a negative impact on small boat operations and fishing activities. The piracy threat is currently LOW (attack is POSSIBLE but UNLIKELY) in these areas, and BENIGN in the Western Indian Ocean.

40. It is assessed that Piracy is currently DETERRED / SUPPRESSED (but not eradicated) due to:

- a. Widespread implementation of Best Management Practice (BMP).
- b. The embarkation of PAST.
- c. The continued presence and monitoring of CMF, EU NAVFOR, other warships and maritime patrol aircrafts in the region.
- d. The prospect of a prison sentence for pirates.
- e. The adoption by former pirates of lower risk, yet profitable, criminal activities such as smuggling.
- f. Improvements in the capabilities and competence of Somali maritime security forces, such as the Somaliland Coast Guard.

41. However, the causal factors of piracy still endure in Somalia and include but are not limited to: poverty, unemployment, the lack of effective governance, corruption, conflict, illegal fishing and over-fishing.

42. Moreover, it is assessed that criminal / piracy networks retain the capability to seize opportunities and mount attacks with little to no notice, albeit at the cost of in-depth planning.

43. It is possible that piracy could re-emerge if some or all the following conditions are met:

- a. The shipping industry ceases to fully implement BMP or embark PAST following an owner's vessel risk assessment.
- b. There is a significant decrease in the presence of warships and local maritime security forces in the area.
- c. The decline in economic and political situation persists, further exacerbating poverty and instability in Somalia and the wider region due to COVID-19, famine, the ripple effects of flooding and locust infestation.

## **Conflict Related – LOW to MODERATE (an attack is possible but unlikely)**

44. The reported 2 explosions against the Maltese flagged MT SYRA on 03 Oct enhanced the need for vessels to remain vigilant when transiting or patrolling in the Gulf of Aden and in the Southern Red Sea. It remains probable that the ship was the target of an attack related to the wider conflict in Yemen as the oil terminal had already been subjected to two attacks in 2020 (Feb and Apr). The threat against vessels of any flag operating from or to ports operated by actors in the Yemen Conflict is therefore considered MODERATE.

45. The threat to KSA or SLC vessels transiting the Red Sea, BAM and GOA remains MODERATE. However, it is assessed that such a threat is LOW for any vessels in transit under another flag.

46. There is a REALISTIC POSSIBILITY that SLC tankers and warships in coastal waters south of Jizan could be attacked by Houthi missiles or unmanned surface vessels/ WBIEDs, and that SLC flagged tankers in the GOA IRTC could be attacked by explosive skiffs or by skiffs with small arms. It is UNLIKELY that MVs that are not associated with nations involved in regional conflict will be attacked, although there is a risk that such vessels could be misidentified or struck by accident.

47. While Houthi forces have ALMOST CERTAINLY deployed naval mines in Yemeni coastal waters in the past and are alleged to have done so as recently as 05 Feb 20 (see IRTB 017), such mines are LIKELY of low quality and are HIGHLY UNLIKELY to drift into international shipping lanes. Therefore, the threat from mines in international waters including the Maritime Security Transit Corridor (MSTC) continues to be LOW.

## **Terrorism – LOW (an attack is unlikely)**


48. Conflicts in Somalia and Yemen continue to provide operating bases and freedom of manoeuvre for regional terrorist organizations such as AS, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and IS in Yemen, Somalia and Mozambique.

49. Two suspected terrorist events have been reported in the last 3 months within Mozambique territorial waters. On 27 Aug 20 a suspected ISCAP amphibious attack might have occurred on Nhonge Island and on 09 Sept 20, ISCAP reportedly seized 2 islands. These events were reported through open sources and have not been independently verified.

50. CMF and EU NAVFOR have agreed upon maintaining the assessed threat from terrorism as LOW.


## **Operations / Maritime Security Centre (Horn of Africa) Analysis**

51. Although the initial impact of COVID19 on the use of PAST on board vessels transiting across the HRA resulted in extended tours of teams on board, the use of PAST would eventually decline in great extent. Nevertheless an updated analysis, including surveys among the industry, reveals that the use of PAST is resuming to normal levels. It is assessed that local regulations in ports in the region, establishing protocols for personnel movements instead of restrictions, has taken the situation to a “new normality” and suggest that initial impact of COVID19 in the use of PAST might have been left behind.




**Figure 4:** Use of PAST in Oct 20

52. The Registration levels with MSCHOA VRS in vessels transiting across the HRA are in normal levels again, with a maximum of 84% in the Gulf of Aden (See Fig. 5), though percentages indicate a decline for registered vessels transiting the VRA, along routes outside the HRA.



**Figure 5:** Registrations with MSCHOA Voluntary Registration Scheme, per sub-areas

53. In September traffic across the region started increasing up to levels pre-COVID19, caused mainly by a recovery of activity in China, namely export in containers and import in general cargo (See Fig. 6). However, new lockdowns in Western countries might cause reductions in global demand and makes it difficult to anticipate that observed increase in traffic will be sustained in the short term.



**Figure 6:** Traffic in Western Indian Ocean Region, based in LTRIT<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Average in November as of 13 NOV.

54. CMF and EU NAVFOR strongly encourage MVs to register with MSCHOA before transiting the VRA (as indicated in Maritime Security Chart Q6099) and implementing protection measures as contained in BMP 5. This will allow EU NAVFOR to allocate risk profiles to vessels transiting the area and permit efficient use of naval assets, as well as a full understanding of traffic behaviour and BMP compliance.

### **CMF activity**

55. CMF HQ has continued to engage across the 33 member nations, regional partners and international organizations to promote regional maritime security and provide assurance to the international maritime industry. The promulgation of CMF boarding mitigation measures has allowed CMF ships to resume boarding operations despite COVID-19 challenges.

56. During the reporting period, CTF 150 under the command of the Saudi Naval Forces has conducted two key operations, namely the Surge Operation (SO) Al SARAWAT from 11-25 Sep 20 and Focused Operation (FO) SEA SHIELD from 11-20 Oct 20 respectively. These resulted in two significant narcotics seizure; a total of 458 kilograms of methamphetamines as well as a total of 1579 kilograms of hashish were seized. These seizures are indicative of ongoing illicit activity in the maritime domain.

57. CTF 151 continued to conduct counter piracy operations in the HRA. Of note, CTF 151 under the command of the Turkish Naval Forces has also conducted one FO SHAMAL from 01 to 07 Oct 20. CTF 152 under the command of the Saudi Border Guard conducted FO TAWAIQ in the Gulf from 08 to 10 Nov 20, and will continue to conduct joint patrols with the regional GCC nations in the region. All CMF Task Forces continue to observe patterns of life in the region, share information with coalition and international partners, and observe varying levels of illicit or suspicious activity.

58. Between 03 -04 Nov 20, the 47<sup>th</sup> SHADE meeting was chaired by CMF and co-chaired by EU NAVFOR. Due to the Pandemic this was the first time the SHADE meeting was held virtually by webinar. There were over 70 participants with representatives from Military Counter Piracy Operations including the Independent Deployer Navies from China, India, Russia as well as many representatives from the Shipping Industry. Presentations are available at the SHADE website (log-in).

### **EU NAVFOR activity**

59. EU NAVFOR has continued to operate along the Gulf of Aden and in the Somali Basin deterring and continuously suppressing piracy and protecting World Food Program (WFP) ships and vulnerable vessels. Somali based piracy is actively deterred, prevented and interrupted by EU NAVFOR's active and reassuring posture.

60. EU NAVFOR has continued to protect WFP vessels by monitoring all WFP vessels, and additionally an EU NAVFOR vessel protection team is embarked on board the WFP vessel continuously operating in the coastal area.

61. EU NAVFOR additionally conducted multiple Focused Operations specifically oriented at the wider origin of piracy. Piracy derives from interrelate features and circumstances of specific areas, such as the presence of criminal networks associated with piracy, fishing



activities conducted by a variety of illegal and illicit actors and the presence of localised maritime law enforcement actors.

62. Throughout the whole period, numerous flights from the EU NAVFOR Somalia's air assets have taken place. These flights were undertaken along the whole coast of Somalia, with the aim of enhancing the overall picture for the situation ashore and providing indicators of a possible resurgence of pirate activity.

63. EU NAVFOR is continuously adapting procedures to continue to contribute to suppressing piracy and increasing maritime security in a safe and effective manner during the COVID-19 pandemic.

64. On the 13 Oct 20 EU NAVFOR Operation Commander Major General Planells hosted the 9<sup>th</sup> Industry Strategy Meeting. The meeting was attended by Deputy Commander of CMF Commodore Basset and Industry Organisations BIMCO, OCIMF, Intertanko, ICS, Intercargo and UKMTO.

## **Conclusion**

65. Regional piracy continues to be suppressed by the combined efforts of naval forces in theatre and the continued implementation of BMP 5 by the maritime community. However, it is crucial that this collaboration and commitment is maintained to ensure that past gains are not lost.

66. The ongoing conflict in Yemen continues to pose a LOW threat to shipping in the BAM, GOA and Southern Red Sea. For SLC and KSA flagged or associated vessels, the threat remains at MODERATE. Although there is still a risk that vessels not directly linked to the SLC could be attacked by accident or because of being misidentified, it is assessed as UNLIKELY that Houthi forces will deliberately target them. Consequently, both CMF and EU NAVFOR have agreed upon an assessed LOW conflict-related threat to merchant shipping not directly linked to the SLC.

67. The threat to shipping from terrorism remains LOW.

68. Masters, operators and owners of merchant vessels are encouraged to continue to report all incidents and suspicious activity to UKMTO and MSCHOA at their earliest convenience<sup>3</sup>. When reporting, it is requested that reports are accurate and comprehensive, providing as much evidentiary information as possible e.g. event logs, photographs, video, radar information and physical samples.

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<sup>3</sup> <https://eunavfor.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/BMP5-PP.pdf>, p. 23.

## Glossary of terms

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<b>AMISOM</b>	African Union Mission in Somalia
<b>AOO</b>	Area of Operation
<b>AQAP</b>	Al Qaeda Arabian Peninsula
<b>AS</b>	Al Shabaab: Terrorist group operating in Somalia
<b>AVPD</b>	Autonomous Vessel Protection Detachment (military detachment)
<b>BAM</b>	Bab-al-Mandeb strait
<b>BMP 5</b>	Best Management Practice (Version 5): IMO and industry sponsored suggested planning and operational practices for ship operators and Masters of ships transiting the Indian Ocean
<b>CMF</b>	Combined Maritime Forces: 33 nation multi-national maritime force operating in Indian Ocean, Red Sea, Arabian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, and Gulf of Aden.
<b>COCOA</b>	Concept for Cooperation ATALANTA
<b>CTF</b>	Combined Task Force
<b>EU NAVFOR</b>	European Union Naval Forces, Op ATALANTA
<b>GOA</b>	Gulf of Aden
<b>GOO</b>	Gulf of Oman
<b>GoY</b>	Government of Yemen
<b>HRA</b>	High Risk Area: Industry defined area where it is considered there is a higher risk of piracy and within which self-protective measures are most likely to be required
<b>IMSC</b>	International Maritime Security Construct
<b>IRG</b>	Internationally Recognized Government
<b>IRTA</b>	Industry Releasable Threat Assessment
<b>IRTB</b>	Industry Releasable Threat Bulletin
<b>IRTC</b>	Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor
<b>ISCAP</b>	Islamic State Central African Province
<b>MSCHOA</b>	Maritime Security Centre (Horn of Africa): The maritime industry control centre for the EU's Op ATALANTA.
<b>MSTC</b>	Maritime Security Transit Corridor
<b>PAG</b>	Piracy Action Groups (group of pirates formed to capture a vessel)
<b>PAST</b>	Private Armed Security Team
<b>POB</b>	Persons on board
<b>SHADE</b>	Shared Awareness and De-confliction

<b>SLC</b>	Saudi Led Coalition
<b>SNA</b>	Somali National Alliance
<b>SRS</b>	Southern Red Sea
<b>STC</b>	Southern Transitional Council
<b>TTPs</b>	Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
<b>UKMTO</b>	United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations, based in Dubai
<b>VRA</b>	Vessel registration Area
<b>WBIED</b>	Water Borne Improvised Explosive Device